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ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BECAUSE MRS DID NOT GIVE UP ITS RIGHT TO REASONABLE POST JUDGMENT ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED IN ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT ON ITS JUDGMENT. 
A. This Court Should Exercise Free Review On Appeal. 
This case presents a complex procedure for determining the standard of review. First, 
the Magistrate Court was to apply a standard of review on the motion for reconsideration. 
Second, the District Court, sitting as an appellate court, was to apply a standard of review of the 
Magistrate Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. Third, this Court is to apply a 
standard of review of the District Court1s appellate decision. 
Likely because this case involves awarding attorney's fees, MRS, the Olsens, and the 
District Court wrongly asserted at the District Court level on appeal that the "abuse of 
discretion" standard often applied to attorney's fees decisions applies here. The Olsens 
continue to apply the "abuse of discretion" standard before this Court. However, for the 
reasons set forth below, MRS believes this is wrong, and this Court should apply free review of 
the Magistrate Court's reconsideration of MRS' Motion for Award of Supplemental Attorney's 
Fees. 
When a trial court decides a motion for reconsideration, it must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). MRS filed a motion for 
reconsideration on its Motion for Award of Supplemental Attorney's Fees. Normally, the 
"awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of 
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trial court and subject to 
of ."' Ransom 1431daho 
a statute applies to a set is a 
question of law. Id. 
Here, the Magistrate Court applied Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) to the facts of this case and 
in the context of an agreement between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall in determining that MRS could 
not recover post judgment fees. Accordingly, the Magistrate Court should have applied a free 
review standard on the motion for reconsideration. It further follows that the District Court 
should have applied and this Court should now apply a free review standard on appeal because 
the application of law to facts presents a question of law, and on appeal "[t]he standard of 
review for questions of law is one of free review." Id. 
Moreover, "where contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of a 
contract's meaning is a question of law." Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192 (1996). And 
111 [t]he determination and legal effect of a contractual provision is a question of law."' Straub v. 
Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007) (quoting Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604,611 (2005)). 
Given that this case involves the interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous 
agreement between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall and applying that agreement to Idaho Code § 12-
120(5), this case presented a question of law to the Magistrate Court, the District Court on 
appeal, and now this Court. Importantly, this Court exercises free review over issues of law. 
Sky Canyon Properties, LLC. v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC., 159 Idaho 162 (2015). 
B. The Olsens Agree That A Judgment Creditor Is Entitled To Recover Fees For Its 
Necessary Efforts To Collect On A Judgment. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(5), a judgment creditor has a right to recover an 
award of post judgment fees incurred attempting to collect on its judgment. The Olsens do not 
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this general proposition. The issue is to is MRS gave 
its right to post judgment fees it to on judgment 
without first discussing the issue of post judgment fees with the Olsens. 
C. The Olsens Wrongly Argue That MRS Cannot Recover Post Judgment Fees Because MRS 
Did Not Either 11) Discuss Such Fees So As To Reach A "Meeting Of The Minds" Or (2) 
Receive An Award Of Such Fees Before Agreeing To Take Payments On The Judgment. 
The Olsens' position on appeal follows both the lower Courts' reasoning for denying 
MRS post judgment fees. Although the Olsens provide variations of their position in many 
different ways throughout their Brief, the Olsens state their position best as follows: 
"If MRS wanted to ensure that post judgment attorney fees were paid as part of 
that debt settlement agreement, then, as the Magistrate Court stated, MRS would need 
to make sure that it specifically included discussion of the attorney fees so that they 
were included in the parties1 'meeting of the minds1 regarding the payment agreement. 
Alternatively, it could have applied for an award of post judgment fees and costs prior to 
making the agreement, so that the fees were automatically included in the judgment."1 
At its core, the Olsens1 argument is that whenever a judgment creditor has incurred post 
judgment fees in collecting on the judgment, and the judgment creditor agrees to accept 
payments on the judgment until paid in full in exchange for not enforcing the judgment under 
Idaho law, the judgment creditor must (1) specifically discuss post judgment fees so that the 
parties "minds meet,11 (i.e., reach agreement) regarding the payment agreement on the fee 
issue; or (2) the judgment creditor must apply for an award of post judgment fees before 
making the agreement. 
The rule the Olsens ask this Court to impose is that a judgment creditor who does not 
satisfy either of these two points cannot recover post judgment fees, as a matter of law, even 
1 Respondent's Brief at p. 16. The Olsens make the same argument in different ways throughout their brief on 
pages 20, 21, 25-26. 
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if parties never discuss the as is actually the 
Olsens can adopt are the never 
result the Olsens seek to achieve. In other words, under a straight contract analysis, the 
Olsens do not have a leg to stand on especially given this Court's reasoning in Straub v. Smith. 
In Straub, this Court applied contractual principles of interpretation to a stipulation 
stating that "if possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of 
the agreement as the best indication of their intent." Id. at 69. The Court in Straub used a 
contractual analysis to determine that a prevailing party was entitled to seek fees where the 
stipulation between the parties was silent on the issue whether either party could seek fees. 
Here, like in Straub, the Court should use a contractual analysis and determine that MRS is 
to 
entitled to recover post judgment fees because the agreement between the parties is silent on 
the issue of fees. 
The balance of this Brief will be spent on explaining why the rule Olsens ask this Court to 
impose is inconsistent with the facts, Idaho law, and sound public policy. 
1. The 0/sens admit the parties had no agreement on the fee issue but seek a result 
as if there were an agreement precluding MRS from recovering fees. 
In at least three instances in their Brief, the Olsens state that MRS did not to raise the 
issue of post judgment fees during the discussions between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall so there 
could be a "meeting of the minds" on the post judgment fees issue.2 "Meeting of the minds" is 
another way of saying "agreement between the parties." Frankly, the Olsens' argument on this 
point is an admission consistent with the undisputed facts that MRS' not raising the issue 
precluded any agreement between the parties on whether the Olsens' payments paid only the 
2 Respondent's Brief at pp. 16, 23, and 25. 
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in full or any fact 
no on payments satisfied not the 
judgment but also any post judgment fees MRS could have recovered, the Olsens ask this Court 
to rule as if there were such an agreement between the parties 
The Olsens' position is also inconsistent with other arguments the Olsens raise on 
appeal. Specifically, the Olsens state at page 22 of their Brief: "In this case, the Magistrate 
Court held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties that paying off the 
judgment in the agreed manner would satisfy the debt."3 It is inconsistent for the Olsens to 
argue repeatedly that there can be no "meeting of the minds" where MRS did not raise the 
issue of post judgment fees, yet at the same time argue that the Magistrate Court correctly 
held there was a "meeting of the minds." Given the undisputed facts that the parties never 
discussed post judgment fees, the only congruent argument is that the parties had no 
agreement on the post judgment fees issue, and the Magistrate Court got it wrong. 
2. Both the lower Courts and the Olsens incorrectly conclude that the Olsens 
reasonably relied on MRS' silence. 
The Olsens argue that the Magistrate Court correctly found that "upon reaching that 
oral agreement, they [Mr. Hall and the Olsens] acted in reliance upon that contract and made 
those payments based on that without any assertion that there would be additional attorney's 
fees at the end."4 But "[s]ilence ordinarily does not establish acceptance without knowledge 
that silence is a mode of acceptance and the offeree intends to accept." Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 
123 Idaho 149, 156 (Ct. App. 1992). 
3 Respondent's Brief at pp. 22-23. 
4 Respondent's Brief at pp. 18. 
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In an attempt to distinguish well-established Idaho the facts this case, 
argue that on the of reliance "was not 
believed that MRS would not seek fees, but rather that the Olsens made a year-long 
course of semi-monthly payments without any assertion by MRS that it would seek attorney 
fees at the end of those payments."5 
No matter how the Olsens couch the argument, one party's silence does not establish 
acceptance of a contractual term. Here, the Olsens agree that the "evidence is undisputed that 
MRS made no mention about its intent to increase the judgment by obtaining an award of post 
judgment attorney fees."6 Although the Olsens may have relied on MRS' silence on this issue, 
such reliance was not reasonable under Idaho law nor did the term MRS was silent about 
become a part of the agreement. See also Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007)(holding that 
there was nothing in a stipulation between the parties that silence indicated an intent that the 
prevailing party would forego the opportunity to pursue fees from the court). 
3. The Olsens fol/ow the Magistrate Court's analysis that unreasonably and 
illogically expands the plain terms of the agreement that MRS' accepting 
payments to satisfy the iudgment also satisfied al! existing obligations known to 
MRS including a claim for post iudgment fees. 
The facts are undisputed that "MRS agreed not to take Mr. Hall's deposition in exchange 
for Mr. Hall's personal commitment to have his firm make, on behalf of the Olsens, two $250 
payments monthly until the judgment had been paid in full" and that the "discussion that led 
to that agreement contained no reference, one way or the other, about supplemental attorney 
5 Respondent's Brief at p. 18. 
6 Respondent's Brief at p. 18. 
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117 added). is at 
judgment in the 
and the Magistrate Court (upheld by the District Court) have expanded the plain terms 
of the agreement so that payments on the judgment not only satisfied the judgment but also 
any obligation by the Olsens to pay post judgment fees. 
It is important for this Court to understand precisely how this happened. At the hearing 
on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Magistrate Court found "[tJhe agreement in this case 
was for the satisfaction of a debt. There was an agreement that if Hall and his firm paid a 
certain amount, and paid off the debt, that th at would satisfy the debt and resolve the issues.,,8 
However, the parties never agreed to accept payments in satisfaction of "the debt.,, The 
parties agreed to accept payments "until the judgment had been paid in full." Moreover, there 
is no evidence that the parties agreed that payment of the judgment in full would resolve any 
issues beyond payment of the judgment. 
The Magistrate Court next found that "at the time the agreement was made for the 
satisfaction of the debt, everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed 
to allow payments to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt."9 Based on 
this, the Magistrate Court denied MRS' request for post judgment fees. In essence, the 
Magistrate Court is saying that the agreement was for satisfaction of "the debt,, which included 
everything known to MRS and specifically MRS' claim for post judgment fees. Therefore, 
according to the Magistrate Court, when MRS agreed to take payments to satisfy the judgment, 
7 Respondent's Brief at pp. 7-8. 
8 TR Vol. I, p. 38 LL. 14-18. 
9 TR Vol. I, p. 39 LL. 3-7. 
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M M 
But MRS agreed only to accept payments until the judgment was paid in full-nothing 
more and nothing less. The Magistrate Court unreasonably and illogically expanded the 
agreement to mean that satisfaction of the judgment also included satisfaction of "the debt," 
i.e., all claims MRS knew it had against the Olsens at the time the parties entered the 
agreement including a claim for post judgment fees. The factual record on appeal does not 
support this broad sweeping conclusion nor does the Magistrate Court's conclusion logically 
follow from the facts. This is particularly true given the fact that Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith never 
discussed the issue of post judgment fees, satisfaction of "the debt," or anything besides 
payments on the judgment. 
On appeal, the Olsens follow the Magistrate Court's analysis explaining that "[t]he court 
implied from that undisputed evidence that the existing judgment was the debt it referred to, 
and that in satisfying the judgment by its payments, the Olsens that would be satisfying the 
debt."10 But neither the Olsens nor the Magistrate Court can reasonably imply from the facts of 
this case that MRS agreed not to seek post judgment fees when MRS accepted $500 per month 
payments until the judgment was paid in full. Again, Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith never discussed 
the issue of post judgment fees, satisfaction of "the debt," or anything besides payments on the 
judgment. 
4. Payment of the iudqment does not mean payment of post iudqment fees or 
preclude recovery of post judgment fees. 
10 Respondent's Brief at p. 14. 
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state M toin 
is right to 
Code§ 1111 However, the Olsens are wrong when they state that "MRS' 
argument is unconvincing."12 Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) states, in part, that post judgment fees 
"shall be set by the court following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs 
with notice to all parties and hearing." This Court has held that "costs and attorney fees are 
collateral issues which do not go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains 
jurisdiction to make such an award after a suit has been terminated." Straub, supra, 145 Idaho 
at 69. In other words, the award of attorney's fees is a separate and distinct right and even 
collateral to the action or judgment itself. 
This proposition is so clear that even the Olsens end up arguing in favor of it in their 
Brief when they state: 
The judgment in this case included prejudgment attorney fees and costs, 
because they were approved by the court. But both when the agreement regarding 
paying the judgment was made, and at the time final payment was made on the 
judgment, no post judgment attorney fees had been so approved. Accordingly, they did 
not and could not have formed any part of the iudqment. 13 
The Olsens' reliance on I.R.C.P. 54 is misplaced because Idaho Code§ 12-120(5} governs 
the fee issue, not Rule 54. The Olsens appear to argue that under Rule 54 fees automatically 
become part of the judgment when approved by the court. Since the court did not approve any 
post judgment fees before the judgment was paid, there is no judgment to which post 
judgment fees now can be added. The problem with this argument is that Rule 54 addresses 
11 Respondent's Brief p. 14. 
12 Respondent's Brief p. 15. 
13 Respondent's Brief p. 16 (Emphasis added). 
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fees whereas Code§ judgment issue in 
not not 
The Olsens ask this Court to impose a rule that would deny a judgment creditor the right 
to recover post judgment fees whenever a judgment debtor pays a judgment in full. In other 
words, a judgment creditor could spend considerable effort attempting to collect on a 
judgment just to have the judgment debtor pay the judgment in full. Under the Oisens' theory, 
a judgment creditor could not seek post judgment fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) because 
they could not be added to the judgment that the judgment debtor has satisfied. Such a rule 
would thwart the entire policy behind Idaho Code§ 12-120(5). 
5. The Olsen's ask this court to shift their duty onto MRS. 
The Olsens argue that "If MRS wanted to ensure that post judgment attorney fees were 
paid as part of that debt settlement agreement, then, as the Magistrate Court stated, MRS 
would need to make sure that it specifically included discussion of the attorney fees .... "14 
Stated differently, "if MRS wanted to ensure that the debt being satisfied meant something 
other than the judgment as it then existed, MRS had the obligation to make that clear so that 
there would be a meeting of the minds of the parties that the debt was not merely the existing 
judgment."15 In other words, the Olsens argue that if MRS wanted to "ensure" that the 
settlement agreement included post judgment fees or some amount more than the judgment 
as it then existed, MRS had the duty to discuss that issue and include it in the agreement.16 
14 Respondent's Brief at p. 16. 
15 Respondent's Brief at p. 21. 
16 Nothing in the record supports the argument that MRS wanted the Olsens to pay something more than the 
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MRS right to recover is so 
statute in context case court 
MRS seeks such an award. Idaho Code§ 12-120(5). No Idaho law confers on the Olsens a right 
to be free of post judgment fees in this case. Thus, on the issue of post judgment fees, MRS 
had a right, and the Olsens had no right. 
Given that MRS had a right to recover post judgment fees, and the Olsens had no right 
to be free of post judgment fees, the duty to raise the issue lies squarely on the Oisens if they 
wanted MRS to forego its right to recover post judgment fees. In other words, if anyone 
wanted to "ensure" that the agreement included payment of the judgment and any post 
judgment fees that MRS had a right to recover, the Olsens were the ones who had the duty to 
raise the issue, not MRS. MRS had no duty to raise the issue because MRS already had a right 
to recover post judgment fees by statute unless MRS waived its right or contractually settled its 
right away. The Olsens' proposed rule unjustifiably shifts their duty onto MRS. 
To illustrate who has the duty to raise the issue seeking a waiver of fees, this Court can 
turn to then Chief Justice Eismann's special concurring opinion in Straub. Justice Eismann 
stated that "Straub's counsel bears some responsibility for the short-circuiting of the 
procedures. Every attorney worth his or her salt knows that if you want to dismiss your 
complaint just before trial and do not want your client to be liable for the defendant's court 
costs and attorney fees, you had better seek a stipulation stating that each party will bear their 
own costs and attorney fees." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 73 (2007) (Eismann, J., 
concurring). 
judgment at the time the parties entered the agreement. Wanting post judgment fees before the judgment is 
even satisfied is like putting the "cart before the horse." 
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or that if you want to a 
efforts you want to 
judgment fees for your client, you had better seek a stipulation stating that payment of the 
judgment, as agreed, includes payment of any post judgment fees that the judgment creditor 
might recover. Moreover, what Justice Eismann did not say is equally as important. Justice 
Eismann did not say, as the Magistrate and District Courts said here, that if the party with a 
right to seek fees wants to ensure its right to seek fees it would need to specificaily discuss that 
issue with opposing counsel so that the issue of fees would be included in the parties' "meeting 
of the minds." 
6. MRS did not have any knowledge unknown to the 0/sens. 
In an attempt to appeal to the Court's collective sense of justice, the Olsens argue that 
MRS has something akin to "superior knowledge" on the issues of post judgment fees. In this 
regard, the Olsens state that "it is clear that MRS knew it had a right to attorney fees under 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(5),"and "MRS's attorneys were surely aware of the nature and extent of 
their post judgment collection efforts since they had both undertaken those efforts and had 
discussed them with both Mr. Olsen and Mr. Hall over the year prior to the agreement."17 The 
Olsens make these statements attempting to persuade the Court that MRS knew facts that the 
Olsens did not know and therefore took advantage of the Olsens by not disclosing this "superior 
knowledge." 
What the Olsens fail to mention is that both parties had the same knowledge. 
Specifically, since both Mr. Olsen and Mr. Hall are also attorneys, they are deemed to have 
17 Respondent's Brief at pp. 17-18. 
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the to 
Mr. 
nature and extent of the post judgment collection efforts since they had been party to and 
witnessed those efforts and had discussed them with MRS over the year prior to the 
agreement. 
r 
Because both parties and their counsel were deemed to know the law regarding post 
judgment fees and had actual knowledge of the post judgment collection efforts undertaken by 
MRS, the Olsens and the lower Courts' arguments regarding MRS' "superior knowledge" is 
without merit. It also follows that since the Olsens also had this knowledge, it was incumbent 
on the Olsens' counsel to have raised the post judgment fee issue during the discussions with 
Mr. Smith at the time the parties made the agreement to make payments on the judgment. 
7. MRS has not raised new issues for the first time in this appeal. 
The Olsens argue that "MRS's arguments have expanded dramatically since the District 
Court Appeal." 18 However, the record shows that MRS has not raised any new issues for the 
first time on appeal. The Olsens claim that "MRS now argues that the denial of attorney fees 
where the subject of attorney fees was not expressly discussed by the parties constituted an 
improper judicial determination of waiver, based on Straub v. Smith." 19 The record shows this 
is not a new argument as even the Olsens point out that "[i]n its argument to the District Court 
on appeal ... MRS argued that the magistrate court improperly implied into the agreement 
between the parties a waiver by MRS of its right to seek post judgment attorney fees." 20 MRS 
18 Respondent's Brief at p. 23. 
19 Respondent's Brief at p. 24. 
20 Respondent's Brief at pp. 21. 
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not issue on to in on 
22 not on has 
only cited a new case, Straub v. Smith, in support of the waiver issue. 
The Olsens further argue that MRS impermissibly raises for the first time on appeal the 
attorney work-product doctrine and case law regarding when a party has a duty to speak. The 
central issue of this case is the lower courts' imposition of a duty on a judgment creditor to 
discuss post judgment fees with a judgment debtor to reach a "meeting of the minds" or obtain 
an award of post judgment fees before agreeing to payments on a judgment. MRS raises 
argument about the work-product doctrine and case law regarding when a party has a duty to 
speak not as new issues but as further reasons why this Court should reject the Olsens' 
proposed rule. 
D. The Olsens' Proposed Rule Is Against Sound Public Policy. 
The Olsens' proposed rule would unnecessarily increase the work load for the courts 
and counsel. Specifically, attorneys attempting to collect on judgments and who want to seek 
post judgment fees for their clients would be required to file a motion for post judgment fees 
after every attempt to collect the judgment just to preserve the ability to recover post 
judgment fees to make their clients whole. Under the Olsens' proposed rule, attorneys would 
practice "defensive filing" for post judgment fees because an attorney's client could consider 
failing to file such a motion to be malpractice. In turn, the courts would be required to process 
and hold hearings on post judgment fee requests that could otherwise be consolidated in a 
single motion resulting in judicial economy. Moreover, many judgment debtors never pay their 
21 R Vol. I, pp. 188-91. 
22 Appellant's Brief on Appeal pp. 13-17. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 16 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.05660\Pleadings\160125 Appellate Reply Brief.docx 
in It no sense to 
in cases never be in first 
The Olsens' proposed rule will discourage or at least delay settlements when sound 
public policy encourages parties to settle legal disputes. Under the Olsens' proposed rule, an 
attorney for a judgment creditor may refuse to set up payments on a judgment until the court 
has awarded post judgment fees-especially when an attorney does not represent a judgment 
debtor. In these instances, the judgment creditor may first want to make a motion for post 
judgment fees so that the attorney for the judgment creditor will not be accused of overstating 
or misrepresenting the unliquidated post judgment amount of fees. This is especially true given 
the rise in claims against attorneys under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's imposition of 
strict liability for false or misleading representations regarding a debt. See ABA Law Trends and 
News Practice Area Newsletter: Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.23 
The Olsens' proposed rule could place the attorney at ethical and legal risk. Judgment 
debtors acting without counsel do not understand terms of art like judgment, satisfaction, 
motion, etc. If an attorney for a judgment creditor is required to discuss the issue of post 
judgment fees before setting up payments on a judgment, the attorney could soon be 
explaining post judgment collection fees, post judgment procedure, how much a court awards, 
etc. A judgment debtor could see this as legal advice-for example, a judgment debtor could 
claim, "the attorney advised me to pay $500 additional attorney's fees. He said this was a 
23 H. Ronald Klasko, Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt collection Practices Act, 
http://www.americanba r .org/ news I etter /publications/law _trends_news_practice_ area_ e_newsletter _home/10 _s 
pring_bl_feat2.html 
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what court n Or a judgment debtor could claims 
in or even 
the attorney. 
The Olsens' proposed rule violates the public policy behind the attorney work-product 
doctrine. The public policy behind the attorney work-product doctrine is that nondisclosure of 
an attorney's thoughts, opinions, mental impressions, and litigation strategy is necessary to the 
effective administration of justice. If an attorney is required to disclose his client's right/intent 
to seek post judgment fees, the attorney is really disclosing litigation strategy. Perhaps the 
attorney believes that the best strategy to settle the case is to tell the judgment debtor about 
post judgment fees and costs to encourage settling everything for payment of only the 
judgment in full right now. Or perhaps the attorney believes the best strategy to make his 
client whole is to have the judgment paid in full before pursuing the issue of post judgment 
fees. In either event, requiring the attorney to make the disclosures that the Olsens ask this 
Court to impose impedes the orderly administration of justice by applying a 11one size fits all" 
approach that invades an attorney's litigation strategy for his client. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons and those set out in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, MRS 
respectfully request that the decision of the District Court affirming the Magistrate Court's 
Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration be reversed and that MRS be awarded its fees and 
costs on appeal. 
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RESPECTIVELY ITTED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
tj.,., 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 / day of February, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ V]U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ],))vernight Delivery 
['&11 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Stephen D. Hall, Esq. 
Peterson, Moss & Hall 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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